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ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose of the paper and literature addressed 
 
This paper addresses questions about the effect that social bonds between relationship 
partners have on the way in which a supplier allocates resources to its relationship with a buyer. 
Two key questions the paper addresses are the following. In business markets, does strength of 
social bonds that a supplier perceives with a specific customer influence the supplier’s 
allocations of financial, physical, time, and intangible resources to this customer relative to other 
customers?  If social bonding does uniquely impact supplier allocation of resources to customers, 
does the impact vary by length of the supplier-customer relationship? The paper proposes and 
empirically examines three alternative theories (honeymoon, maturity, and imprinting theories) 
that indicate how suppliers’ perceptions of social bonds with customers influence the suppliers’ 
allocations of resources and also examines the proposition that social bonding contributes 
uniquely to supplier allocations.  Honeymoon theory is the proposal that the positive influence of 
social bonding on supplier resource allocation is greatest in relatively new supplier-customer 
relationships versus long-term relationships.  Maturity theory proposes the opposite—the 
positive influence of social bonding on supplier resources allocation is greatest in long-term 
versus new relationships.  Imprinting theory proposes that no interaction occurs between the 
effects of social bonding and length of supplier-customer relationship on supplier resource 
allocations.  The theoretical grounding for the study extends the IMP stream of research, using 
ideas including the concepts of relationship marketing theory and Homans’ framework for social 
behavior. 
 
Research method 
 
The study collects data on seven-point scales from 314 sales and marketing managers in 
New Zealand manufacturers. The study then analyzes relationships between variables using 
correlations, including partial correlations to separate the effects of financial bonding from social 
bonding; path analysis; and tipping point analysis. 
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Research findings 
 
Analyses of data from a national survey of marketing and sales managers in New Zealand 
manufacturing firms support the view that social bonding does impact supplier allocation of 
resources to customers beyond the impact expectations of customer profitability.  The findings 
confirm that both the imprinting theory model and the maturity theory model of the impact of 
social bonding on supplier resource allocation are relevant, depending on the specific resource 
that the analysis considers. 
 
Main contribution 
 
The findings indicate that relationship managers need to take into account the clear effect 
that creation of strong social bonds in buyer-seller relationships has on the way in which 
suppliers allocate resources to those relationships. This is an important consideration, given the 
effect that the allocation of resources such as money, time, and knowledge has on the success of 
relationships.  
 
Keywords 
 
Relationships; resource allocation; social bonds 
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SOCIAL BONDS AND SUPPLIER ALLOCATION 
OF RESOURCES TO BUSINESS CUSTOMERS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
The IMP literature (Hakansson, 1982; Hakansson & Snehota, 1995) has a strong focus on the 
issues of interaction between firms and on the actors in relationships, the resource links between 
actors, and the activities that take place within the relationship. Amongst the resources that actors 
work with are their firms’ inputs into the relationship of dollars, physical items, time, and 
intangibles such as knowledge. These inputs relate to the bonds, including the financial and 
social bonds, which form between the firms, but what are these relationships in detail? This 
article provides some answers to that question by empirically investigating social behavior 
influences in the context of buyer-seller relationships. It specifically investigates the following 
questions. In business markets, does strength of social bonds that a supplier perceives with a 
specific customer influence the supplier’s allocations of financial, physical, time, and intangible 
resources to this customer relative to other customers?  If social bonding does uniquely impact 
supplier allocation of resources to customers, does the impact vary by length of the supplier-
customer relationship?   
Homans (1961, p. 390) reviews substantial evidence supporting his assertion, “As the 
institutions of civilization depart further and further from elementary social behavior, the latter 
does not disappear in proportion.  Far from it, it persists obviously and everywhere, ready to take 
its revenge.”  The present article considers a tenet that builds from Homans’ (1961, p. 75) 
general rule of distributive justice:  a person in an exchange relation with another will expect that 
the rewards of each be proportional to her/his costs—the greater the rewards, the greater the 
costs—and the net rewards, or profits, of each person be proportional to her/his investments—the 
greater the investments, the greater the profit.  This general rule of distributive justice may be 
extendable to a view that strong social bonds, in contrast to weak bonds, are investments by both 
parties in the relationship that result in greater allocation of resources by each party to the other.   
This article examines this tenet from the perspective of manufacturer suppliers in 
business markets.  The findings in this report do support the perspective that a supplier’s 
perception of comparatively strong social bond with one customer (say, customer X) versus other 
customers (customers Y and Z) increases the supplier’s allocation of resources into the 
relationship with customer X relative to Y or Z. The article also investigates how the level of 
social bonding in a relationship, whether high, medium, has a negative, positive or neutral 
interaction effect on social bonding and length of the relationship. The study considers three 
models of resource allocation: the “honeymoon theory”; the “maturity theory”; and the 
“imprinting theory”. 
 The relevant strategic management literature (Barney, 1986, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 
1989) advocates analyzing firms and “interfirms” (Baum & Ingram, 2002) from the resource as 
well as the product perspective:  “If a privileged product market position is achieved or protected 
by the deployment of scarce assets, it is necessary to account for the opportunity cost of those 
assets” (Dierickx & Cool, 1989, p. 1509).   Barney (1986, p. 1231) introduces the concept of a 
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"strategic factor market" as "a market where the resources necessary to implement a strategy are 
acquired."  
The implementation of a strategy may require assets that are usually nonappropriable.  
Social bonding among managers in interfirm relationships is usefully viewable as one process of 
acquiring such nonappropriable assets, which are unique and inimitable and hence provide 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991).  Dierickx and Cool (1989) stress that nonappropriability 
may stem from various sources, such as the absence of well-defined property rights, or 
"bookkeeping feasibility" problems (see, e.g., Bator, 1958; Meade, 1952).  Clearly, markets for 
such assets do not exist. Loyalty of one's dealers or the trust of one's customers cannot be bought.  
Dealer loyalty must be cultivated, and customers' trust must be earned through a history of 
honest dealings.   
As Arrow (1974, p. 23) points out: "Unfortunately, [trust] is not a commodity 
which can be bought very easily. If you have to buy it, you already have some 
doubts about what you've bought. Trust and similar values, loyalty or truth 
telling, are examples of what the economist would call "externalities".  They 
are goods, they are commodities; they have real, practical economic value; 
(…) But they are not commodities for which trade on the open market is 
technically possible or even meaningful." (Dierickx & Cool, 1989, p. 1505) 
In the marketing literature, Hunt & Morgan (1995) offer a “comparative advantage theory 
of competition” in which “resources are the tangible and intangible entities available to the firm 
that enable it to produce efficiently and/or effectively a market offering that has value for some 
market segment or segments (cf. Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984).” 
For example, a firm's core competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) are 
intangible, higher order resources that enable it to perform—better perhaps 
than its competitors—the activities in Porter's (1985) "value chain." Drawing 
on Barney (1991), Day, and Wensley (1988), and  Hofer and Schendel (1978), 
we propose that the multitude of potential resources can be most usefully 
categorized as financial (e.g., cash reserves, access to financial markets), 
physical (e.g., plant, equipment), legal (e.g., trademarks, licenses), human 
(e.g., the skills and knowledge of individual employees), organizational (e.g.. 
competencies, controls, policies, culture), informational (e.g., knowledge 
resulting from consumer and competitor intelligence), and relational (e.g., 
relationships with suppliers and customers). (Hunt & Morgan, 1995, pp. 5-6) 
In proposing their comparative advantage theory of competition, Hunt and Morgan call 
for testing all propositions they set forth in the theory.  “Specifically, because we adopt the 
epistemology of scientific realism (Hunt, 1991), each premise is offered as a proposition that can 
and should be subjected to empirical testing.”  The present article reports empirical testing of a 
tenet that is viewable as part of comparative advantage theory--the tenet is that interfirm 
relationships (social and financial) affect how suppliers allocate their resources to customers.  
The present article is unique and valuable in its consideration of alternative theories of how 
social bonding may affect interfirm allocation of resources, in empirically testing these 
alternative theories, and in the article’s implications for advancing theory and marketing 
management practice.   
 Following this introduction, section two of the article presents a review of relevant 
literature.  Section three includes formal statements of alternative theories of the impact of social 
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bonds on supplier (or customer) allocations of resources.  Section four describes the method for 
examining the theories empirically.  Section five presents the findings from the study.  Section 
six discusses implications for theory and managing relationships among suppliers and business 
customers.  Section seven discusses limitations.  Section eight offers conclusions and suggestions 
for future research. 
 
THEORY AND RESEARCH ON SOCIAL BONDS 
AMONG SUPPLIERS AND BUSINESS CUSTOMERS 
Theory in business relationship marketing includes the proposition that buyers and sellers 
having strong personal relationships are more committed to maintaining the relationship than less 
socially bonded partners (Wilson, 1995).   Survey research by Wilson and Mummalaneni (1986) 
and Mummalaneni and Wilson (1991) supports this proposition; however, Han and Wilson 
(1993) find that social bonding did not contribute to buyer-seller commitment in a relatively 
complex buying context. Rodríguez and Wilson (2002) propose that perceived strength of social 
bonds affects trust in the business partner positively and that both social bond and trust influence 
commitment to the relationship; they support these two propositions in analyses of survey data 
on U.S. and Mexican strategic alliances.   
Relevant theory includes the perspective that psychological antecedents include “personal 
bonding” or “social bonding” (Han, 1991; Wilson & Mummalaneni, 1986) and social bonds 
“encompass resources that are emotional or affective in nature. As such, social bonding entails 
familiarity, friendship, and personal confidence built through interpersonal exchange. It 
measures the strength of a personal relationship and may range from business to close, personal 
ties” (Rodrίguez & Wilson, 2002, p. 55).  Thus, the concept of social bonding as a resource 
antecedent in business marketing-customer relationships provides theoretical ground for the 
proposal that social bonding as a resource associates with the investment of other resources in 
the relationships. While not referring to social bonding specifically, Anderson (1995) and 
Anderson and Narus (1991) express the view that the prosperity of firms depends on having 
“close, collaborative, relationships with selected suppliers, customers, and value-added retailers.  
Thus, management thinking has advanced to gaining a better understanding of which firms they 
ought to engage in these collaborative relationships and how to make these relationships work in 
practice” (Anderson, 1995, p. 346, italics in the original). 
Favorable versus unfavorable social bonding is viewable as one component of “close, 
collaborative, relationships with selected suppliers, customers, and value-added retailers.”  Does 
such social bonding really make a unique contribution in influencing the allocation of financial, 
physical, time, and intangible inputs (knowledge, skills, ingenuity, and business contacts) in a 
supplier and business customer relationship?  If yes, does this unique contribution affect the 
prosperity of the supplier and/or the customer firm in the relationship?  While research on the 
impact of social bonding on trust and commitment supports such relationships, the propositions 
relating to the association of social bonding with the allocation of other resources and social 
bonding’s unique influence on the prosperity of the firm are topics for empirical investigation. 
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ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF SOCIAL BONDING’S INFLUENCE 
ON SUPPLIER ALLOCATIONS OF OTHER RESOURCES 
Figure 1 shows three alternative theories of social bonding’s relationships with supplier 
resource allocation.  “Honeymoon theory” (Panel A in Figure 1) is a descriptive term that 
suggests that a negative interaction effect occurs for social bonding and length of the relationship 
on resource allocation (cf. Deeds & Rothaermel, 2003; Fichman & Levinthal, 1991).  According 
to the honeymoon theory, the highest level of social bonding occurs early in supplier-customer 
relationships and this bonding results in the highest level of supplier resource allocations to 
customers having such early high levels of social bonding.  Rationale:  all relationships 
eventually include problems and misunderstandings that result in declines in social bonding 
levels between suppliers and customers so that even though a supplier allocates greater resources 
to customers with high versus low social bond levels in late, well-established, relationships, the 
differences in resources allocation is substantially less in comparison to the respective allocations 
made in early-stage relationships.   
 
 Fichman and Levinthal (1991) inform the theoretical model for the occurrence of 
honeymoon relationships:   
In contrast to the emphasis in the literature on the liabilities of newness, we 
suggest that relationships can start with some initial stock of assets, which 
(depending on the particular context) can include favorable prior beliefs, trust, 
goodwill, financial resources, or psychological commitment. We propose that 
if a relationship starts with an initial stock of assets, the risk of the 
relationship dissolving at its inception is reduced, even if the initial outcomes 
of the relationship are unfavorable. These unfavorable outcomes can take the 
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form of poor performance evaluations in the context of employment relations 
or unsatisfactory service in an inter-organizational relationship. We also 
propose that the duration of this honeymoon period is likely to vary with the 
magnitude of these initial assets. (Fichman & Levinthal, 1991, pp. 443-444) 
However, Fichman and Levinthal’s (1991) review of the empirical literature 
supporting the existence of such relationships does not examine the roles of specific 
assets (e.g., social bonding and financial bonding) supporting or refuting their main 
proposition that relationships are unlikely to terminate early in a relationship.  Also, 
the Fichman and Levinthal review does not examine how the stock of assets in a 
relationship affects dollar, physical, time, and intangible resource allocations into the 
relationships.  Considering the shape of association of length-of-time in relationships 
and the dissolution of the relationships as Fichman and Levinthal report does not 
indicate how asset stocks are influencing resource allocations for new, adolescent, 
and mature relationships.  Support or refutation of the honeymoon model and 
alternative models of relationship stock assets on relationship behaviors requires 
examining assets and behavior outcomes within the relationship--behavior outcomes 
such as resource allocations by one or both parties in the relationship, as the current 
study does. 
In comparison to the honeymoon model, the maturity theory suggests the opposite view.  
The impact of strong versus weak social bonds grows stronger over the years (Panel B in Figure 
1).  Over time some business-to-business relationships build up high versus low levels of 
interdependency, trust, and comfort in comparison to others. High levels of these assets serve to 
increase the relative allocations of resources by firms in the relationship.  Baum and Ingram 
(2002, p. 193) suggest that interdependencies and relational embeddedness in “interfirm” 
organizational groups build from resource procurements and allocations, uncertainty reduction, 
and the creation of stable, preferential, relationships:   
We argue that interfirms are structured around a broad set of economic and 
non-economic interdependencies, facilitating organizational cooperation in 
pursuit of many different interests…. In broad terms, interdependence focuses 
on two considerations: resource procurement and uncertainty reduction 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Organizations form inter-organizational relations 
to access resources that are essential to pursuing their goals but are at least in 
part controlled by other organizations. 
Baum and Ingram (2002) and Baum, Shipilov, and Rowley (2003) stress the role of 
relational embeddedness in deepening and strengthening interfirm relationships.  Relational 
embeddedness highlights effects of dyadic ties between firms on subsequent cooperation 
between them (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). To reduce search costs and alleviate risks of 
opportunism that might occur with interfirm relationships, firms tend to create stable, preferential 
relationships characterized by trust and rich information exchange with specific partners. Prior 
direct ties provide channels through which each partner can learn about the competencies and 
reliability of the other, amplifying trust and diminishing uncertainty associating with future ties 
(Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000; Gulati, 1995).  Baum et al. (2003) offer an empirical study showing 
that the working ties among banks expand with the maturing of relationships.  Such empirical 
research on maturity theory in interfirm relationships is inherently appealing but does not address 
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directly the following question.  Is the higher allocation of resources by a partner in contexts 
where social and financial bonds are strong, versus weak, more pronounced in mature interfirm 
relationships than in new interfirm relationships? This question is the focal issue in the present 
study. 
Imprinting theory, or consistent growth theory, predicts no interaction effect for social 
bonding and length of the relationship on supplier allocation of resources (Panel C in Figure 1).  
The old saw, “You don’t get a second chance to make a first impression,” reflects thinking that 
supports consistent growth theory.  Consistent growth theory recognizes that no relationship 
starts out as a strong tie, but interfirm embeddedness works as a priming mechanism through 
which small initial offers of trust and assistance strengthen into a resilient tie, provided that they 
are reciprocated (Heugens & Zyglidopoulos, 2008).  Pursey et al. (2008, p. 332) stress that the 
interfirm “relationship acquires a social character above and beyond the technical characteristics 
of the exchange at hand (Granovetter, 1985). As the exchange loses its anonymity, partners start 
building relationships in which trust and mutual reliance rise to the fore (Uzzi, 1999).”   
The proposition is that interfirm imprinting provides an advantage for a customer (or 
supplier) in an interfirm relationship that consistently carries across many exchange occasions 
and many years of the relationship.  This micro view of interfirm relationships is viewable as an 
extension of Stinchcombe’s (1965) proposal concerning macro economic and technical 
conditions, as the imprinting forces, affecting appropriate organizational form in terms of social 
structure.  “Subsequent research suggests that imprinting may have long lasting effects upon the 
strategies, strategic choices, and operating practices of firms (Bamford, Dean, & McDougall, 
2000; Boeker, 1989; Kimberly, 1979; Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006; Schein, 1983)” (Kriauciunas & 
Shinkle, 2008, p. 4).    
We consider Organizational Imprinting the forgotten theory, since the impact 
of imprinting has been understudied, under recognized, or both. We believe 
this has occurred due to two reasons: (1) research that reflects organizational 
imprinting has been misclassified as something other than imprinting, and (2) 
research related to firms has not fully addressed the initial point of firm 
behavior which is a topic that can be enhanced by imprinting theory. 
(Kriauciunas & Shinkle, 2008, p. 10) 
The above discussion informs the following hypotheses.  H1:  Social bonding in interfirm 
relationships has a positive influence on suppliers’ allocation of resources to customers.  H2:  To 
some meaningful extent, the positive social-bonding influence in interfirm relationships on 
suppliers’ relative allocation of resources is independent from the impact of financial bonds 
between customers and suppliers.   
The honeymoon model, H3:  social bonding and length of the relationship with a 
business-to-business customer has a negative interaction effect on the supplier’s relative 
allocation of resources to the customer.  The maturity model, H4: social bonding and length of 
the relationship with a business-to-business customer has a positive interaction effect on the 
supplier’s relative allocation of resources to the customer.  The imprinting model, H5: no 
interaction effect occurs for social bonding and length of the relationship with a business-to-
business customer on the supplier’s relative allocation of resources to the customer.   
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METHOD 
 
The method for empirically testing the hypotheses included completing several steps:  
exploratory interviews with managers, measurement development and pretesting, pretesting the 
instrument, survey data collection, and data analysis.  The study conducted and analyzed seven 
exploratory interviews with managers to check face validity of the constructs. The following 
sections give more detail of this process. 
 
Measurement Instrument Development and Testing 
 
A mail survey collected data to test the hypotheses. Prior to the main survey, the study included 
the development of the single-item scales (Rossiter, 2002, p. 313) for the focal concepts in the 
hypotheses. The questionnaire used seven-point Likert-type statements, with only the end points 
of the scales labeled. The anchor points for supplier allocation of resources relative to other 
relationships were “Very much lower” to “Very much higher”.  For social and financial bonding 
the anchor points were “I do not agree at all: to “I fully agree”.   The survey asked sample frame 
members to write in the number of years their firm has had a relationship with the focal 
customer. 
Academics with knowledge of the relationship field and others with expertise in questionnaire 
design worked through the draft questionnaire and made comments. After appropriate 
modification to the questionnaire, five practitioners then worked through it. These processes 
resulted in minor additional modifications. The researchers then mailed out 200 pilot 
questionnaires. The 28 responses from this pilot survey indicated that there was a need to specify 
more exactly the selection criteria by the respondent for choice of subject for the questionnaire. 
The pilot study established that if respondents were left to choose for themselves which 
relationship they used as the subject for their questionnaire answers, they would tend to choose a 
customer that they perceived favorably on all items, thereby providing data that were skewed and 
did not have as much variance as desired for effective analysis.  Substantial variance in the data 
was necessary for effective analysis; hence, based on an approach used by Anderson and Narus 
(1990), respondents to the main survey selected their fourth largest customer as the subject. This 
approach, reinforced by discussion of their fourth largest customer with several sales managers 
prior to mailing the main survey, helped to obtain a spread of relationship types. The received 
surveys include a wide range of relationship durations and standard deviations ranging from 1.1 
to 1.6 on the 1–7 scale for the items used in the study. 
The study includes a validation item “Our firm shares a lot of goals with this customer.” 
to examine the nomological validity of the constructs. The observed pattern of relationships 
among constructs should match with theoretical expectations: see Peter (1981). Wilson (1995) 
proposes that establishing strong mutual goals has the widest range of associations in integrating 
relationship variables and in the relationship development processes. Meeting theoretical 
expectations, the responses to “sharing a lot of goals” more closely relate to the social and 
financial bonding items than to the resource allocation items or length of time in the relationship.  
The findings confirm these predictions; Table 2 in the results section reports the correlations of 
all items with the validation item. 
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The appendix includes the specific instructions and scale items in the survey for the four 
supplier resource allocations in the study:  dollars, physical items, time, and intangible inputs.  
The appendix also includes the specific instructions and items for social and financial bonding 
relationships. 
 
Sample and Data Collection 
 
The researchers distributed the self-administered mail questionnaire to a randomly 
selected sample from a sample frame comprising managers in marketing or sales positions in 
New Zealand suppliers or distributors of manufactured goods on the database of a multinational 
directory company. After telephone verification of recipient names and addresses, 1407 
questionnaires were mailed out and 318 responses received back after mailing of a postcard 
reminder, for a 23% response rate. Of the 318 responses, 314 were usable.  Early and late 
responses were analyzed as Armstrong & Overton (1977) suggest for assessing nonresponse 
bias:  significant differences were not found in t-tests on key items in the questionnaire.   
The New Zealand economy is a small one, thus, the sample is a good representation of 
the size of companies in the sector and the distribution of sizes is similar to that in the sample 
frame.  The respondents were mainly sales managers (45%), marketing managers (21%), sales 
and marketing managers (14%), or in a CEO/General Manager /Director position (9%). Others 
were in positions such as product manager or customer service manager, making them qualified 
to respond concerning relationships with buyers. The buyers used by respondents as the 
questionnaire subject came from a range of primary product, manufacturing, and service firms.  
Baxter and Matear (2004) provide additional details on the sample respondent characteristics. 
 
Data Analyses 
 
Analyses include individual level and group level examination of the data.  Bivariate 
correlations assess relationships between social and financial bonds on one hand and four 
resource allocation constructs on the other hand. Partial correlation analysis assesses the effect of 
social bonds independent of financial bonds. Path models are used to illustrate the relationships 
between social bonding, financial bonding, years in relationship and their resource allocation 
outcomes. The examinations of relationships include tipping point analysis, as McClelland 
(1998) recommends and illustrates for psychological variables.  McClelland (1998) observes that 
the changes in a psychological or societal variable make little difference until they reach a 
certain level.  Relationships for the independent variable and outcome variables are often 
nonlinear and not well described by correlation coefficients.  Instead, they are described 
accurately as tipping points (Gladwell, 1996).  In his 1998 paper, McClelland divides scores for 
an independent construct to form five groups of respondents from very low to very high and 
reports each group’s scores for a dependent construct.  The present study also includes this data 
analysis method. 
The analyses by the researchers include examining relationships using the full range of 
scores and also using summary measures of low (1-3), medium (4-5), and high (6-7) social and 
financial bonding scores.  The findings using these alternative scoring procedures differed very 
little to not at all.  Consequently, the findings in this article are for the summary measures of low, 
medium, and high social bonding scores (low = 1, medium = 2, and high = 3). 
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FINDINGS 
 
Social Bonding and Supplier Resource Allocations 
 
The findings of data analyses in Table 1 and Figure 2 support H1:  Social bonding in 
interfirm relationships has a positive influence on suppliers’ allocation of resources to customers.  
The findings show a consistent pattern for allocations across the four categories of resources: 
dollars, physical items, time, and intangibles.   
The ANOVA findings are significant statistically (p < .000 for 3 of the 4 categories of 
resources) and the eta2 values indicate modest but meaningful effects sizes for three resource 
categories.  The patterns of resource allocation scores indicate an overall linear increasing impact 
of social bonding on supplier resource allocations:  lowest allocations for the informants in the 
total low social bonding group in Figure 2 and highest allocations for the informants in the total 
high social bonding group. 
  
Social Bonding’s Influence on Resource Allocation Controlling for Financial Bonding 
 
The findings support H2:  To some meaningful extent, the positive social-bonding 
influence in interfirm relationships on suppliers’ relative allocation of resources is independent 
from the impact of financial bonds between customers and suppliers.  Table 2 includes the 
bivariate and partial correlations of social bonding and financial bonding influences with the four 
supplier resource allocations.   
The bivariate correlations indicate statistically significant relationships for social bonding 
(and financial bonding) with all four resource allocation constructs.  Three of the four partial 
correlations of social bonding with the four resource allocation constructs, controlling for 
financial bonding, are significant statistically.   
Figure 2 is a visual of the mean scores for resource allocations in dollars for the three 
levels of social bonding controlling for the three levels of financial bonding.  Focusing on the 
low versus high levels of social bonding by the low level versus the high level of financial 
bonding indicates modest increases in dollar resource allocations:  3.77 to 3.94 and 4.67 to 4.83, 
respectively.  A consistent pattern is observable in Figure 2 for low to high social bonding for the 
medium level of financial bonding as well: 4.25 to 4.47.  Such patterns of modest increase in 
resource allocations occur for 11 of the 12 possible comparisons for the other three resource 
allocations (physical items, time, and intangibles) for the low to high social bonding range, 
controlling for the three levels of financial bonding (p < .01 by a sign test).   
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Table 1 
Resource Allocations by Supplier to Customers with Low, Medium, and High Social Bonds 
with the Supplier by Years in the Relationship 
 
 
Social               Years in                      _____________________________Resource_______________________________________ 
Bonding           Relationship                    Dollars                 Physical Items                 Time                    Intangibles (KSIB)        
                                                                M         s.e.                 M         s. e.                  M        s.e.                  M         s.e.                  n 
Low                    1 – 5                             3.50     .19                 3.69      .27                   4.58     .22                   4.85       .25                26 
                           6 – 8                             4.00     .21                 3.94      .30                   4.65      .31                   5.29       .21                17 
                           9 – 10                           3.63     .33                 3.38      .30                   4.56      .24                   5.06       .27                16 
                          11 – 16                          4.38     .31                 3.62      .49                   5.12      .25                   5.08       .24                13 
                          17 +                               4.00     .28                 3.85      .24                   4.50      .26                   4.70       .19                20 
                           Total                             3.85     .19                 3.70      .14                   4.65      .11                   4.97       .11                92 
Medium            1 – 5                              4.63     .34                 3.37      .36                   4.89      .33                   4.95       .28                19 
                           6 – 8                              4.11    .28                 3.64      .31                   4.86      .18                    4.86       .18                28 
                           9 – 10                            4.20    .28                 3.96      .31                   4.92      .23                    5.40       .21                25 
                          11 – 16                           4.43    .30                 3.48      .29                   4.78      .25                    5.30       .23                23 
                           17 +                               4.47    .19                 3.73      .21                   5.13      .16                    5.37       .17                30 
                           Total                             4.35     .12                3.65       .13                   4.93      .10                    5.18       .09              125 
High                  1 – 5                              4.12     .27                3.52       .30                   4.96    1.06                    5.52       .15                25 
                           6 – 8                              5.11    .28                 4.32       .41                   5.42    1.39                    5.84       .21                19 
                           9 – 10                            4.43    .31                 4.57       .33                   5.14      .66                    5.79       .24                14 
                          11 – 16                           4.35    .24                 4.17       .33                   5.57      .95                    5.70       .21                23 
                          17 +                                5.25    .23                 4.56       .37                   5.38     .81                     5.63       .26                16 
                          Total                               4.60    .13                4.15       .16                    5.30    1.03                    5.68       .09                97 
F-value                                                         8.67                         3.67                              8.32                                12.93            
DF = 2/331 (p < )                                       (.000)                       (.027)                            (.000)                              (.000) 
η
2    (Eta2)                                                                               .053                         .023                               .051                                .077 
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Table 2
Relationships of Four Resource Allocations, Social, and Financial Bonding Variables:
Double-Headed Arrows Show Bivariate Correlations of Resources with Social Bonding above the Diagonal
and Partial Correlations of Resources with Social Bonding Controlling for Financial Bonding below the Diagonal
Variable                                                                                        1          2    3          4          5          6          7b 8e          
1.  Dollar your firm puts into the relationship 34         38       26        23        13         11    21
2.  Physical items such as equipment…                                                                               28      20        12  12         07         16      
3.  Time that firm’s personnel spend working…                                                                            57a 23        20        08         30                             
4.  Your intangible inputs, such as knowledge, …                                                                                     27        28 05         24            
5.  Social:  We have strong social bonds with people…c 20       10          19       22                    22        01        34
6.  Financial:  This relationship is very profitable for us d 09       10          15       23                                03        39                           
7.  Years:  For how many years has your firm …                                                                                        - 02
8.  Validation item:  “Our firm shares a lot of goals with this customer” e                                                                 
Note.  Decimals omitted; r > .10, p < .05; r > .18, p < .01.
a Highest correlation (r = .57) indicates that high intangible inputs into a relationship take a lot of time resources.
b Years of relationship has significant relationship with only one resource, dollars; finding is suggestive that more versus less
profitable relationships survive for longer periods.
c Partial correlations of resources with social bonding controlling for financial bonding.
d Partial correlations of resources with financial bonding controlling for social bonding.
e Validation correlations matches pattern correlation predictions: highest for two bonding variables and nonsignificantly with 
years.  
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Findings Relevant for the Honeymoon Model 
 
The findings do not support the honeymoon model, as Table 1 shows.  Table 1 reports 
means, standard errors, and sample sizes for the relevant comparisons. Unlike the prediction of 
the honeymoon model, the resource allocation means for the informants reporting high social 
bonding with their fourth largest customers consistently are higher (not lower) for mature versus 
new relationships for all four resource allocation categories.  
Illustrative of similar patterns observable for allocations of all four resources (Table 1), 
Figure 3 plots the means in Table 1 for dollar resource allocations for the five time periods 
controlling for the three levels of social bonding.  Considering a tipping point analysis 
(McClelland,1998) of the extreme new-to-mature relationships for the low-to-high social 
bonding means, the findings for the two dotted-lines most resemble the imprinting model rather 
than the other two proposed models for the dollar resource allocations, because they have similar 
gradients. They therefore show no great difference in resource allocation across differing 
relationship durations. 
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Findings Relevant for the Maturity Model 
 
The findings offer mixed support for the maturity model for two of the four resource 
allocation categories.  Modest decreases in average resource allocation occur in the low social 
bonding group for “time that your personnel spend working on the relationship” and “intangible 
inputs, such as knowledge, skills, ingenuity, and your business contacts” across the relationships 
in the five time periods.  In contrast, increases occur for these two resource allocation categories 
across the relationships in the five time periods for the high social bonding groups.  See Table 1 
for these findings.  
The tipping-point observed patterns for the time and intangible resource allocations 
match with the maturity model.  Customers in long-term sour relationships with suppliers are 
particularly likely to receive less time with supplier personnel and receive less intangible inputs 
of knowledge, skills, ingenuity, and business contacts (KSIB) in comparison to customers in 
long-term sweet relationships. 
 However, these observations only follow from examining the findings in Table 1.  Path 
analyses of social bonding, years in the relationship, and their interactions to explain each of the 
four resource allocations do not support a social bonding-by-years in the relationship interaction 
effect.   
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Findings Relevant for the Imprinting Model 
 
Examining the findings in Table 1 and Figure 2, the imprinting model receives modest 
support for two of the four resource allocations:  dollar and physical items.  A path model for 
dollar resource allocation supports the imprinting model.  The findings of this path model and the 
path models for the other three resource allocations appear in Figure 4.   
 
 
A key point relevant to these findings is that the advantage in receiving relatively greater 
resource allocations from suppliers for customers having high versus low social bonding 
relationships is greater for mature than it is for new relationships.  Time does not heal or nurture 
wounds that may exist in low social bond relationships. 
For the path models in Figure 4, the presence of the interaction term for social bonding 
and financial bonding without the independent term for either bonding variable for three of the 
four resources, specifically physical items, time, and intangibles, supports Wilson’s (1995, p. 
339) proposition that the interaction of relationship bonds “may be greater than the sum of their 
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parts in creating a force to hold a relationship together” (and, as the present study indicates, to 
encourage the allocation of resources).  The interaction terms alone in three of the four path 
models in Figure 5 indicate that the combination of high social bonding and high financial 
bonding usually results in higher levels of resource allocations than high-medium or high-low 
combinations of these two bonding processes.  Examination of averages for the nine 
combinations of three social bonding levels by three financial bonding levels supports this 
conclusion for allocations across all four resources. 
 
DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
 The findings on the present study support important propositions.  (1) High versus low 
social bonding positively affects the supplier allocations of tangible and intangible resources to 
customers.  (2) The positive social bonding influence on resource allocations occurs 
independently to some meaningful extent from the impact of financial bonding on resource 
allocations.  (3) Social bonding’s influence on resource allocation occurs in mature as well as 
new relationships.  (4) The maturity and imprinting models of social bonding’s influence on 
supplier resource allocations are more germane than the honeymoon model--the particular model 
most relevant appears to be contingent on the particular resource under examination.  (6) The 
highest levels of supplier resource allocations occur in conditions of high social bonding in 
conjunction with high financial bonding for three of the four resource allocations: allocation of 
physical items as resources is the exception.  The comparison of this best conjunction with the 
opposite conjunction is striking, as the means of 4.83 versus 3.77 show in Figure 2 for “dollars 
your firm puts into the relationship”.  
 These conclusions support both Homan’s (1958) theoretical (and still radical) perspective 
in sociology and Wilson and Jantrania’s (1994) rationale for practice in adopting a relationship 
versus a transactional mode of interfirm behavior.  Homans (1958, p. 597) theoretically proposes 
that viewing “social behavior as an exchange of goods may clarify the relationships among four 
bodies of theory: behavioral psychology, economics, propositions about the dynamics of 
influence, and propositions about the structure of small groups.”  High social bonding serves as a 
foundation or lubricant for customers for gaining financial, physical, time, and important 
intangible (KSIB) allocations from suppliers.  In his article Homans (1958, p. 606) implies such 
a view is anathema in sociology, “Of all our many ‘approaches’ to social behavior, the one that 
sees it as an economy is the most neglected, and yet is the one we use every moment of our lives-
-except when we write sociology.” 
  Wilson (1995) observes that one of the largest barriers to adoption of the relationship 
model is the organizational reward system, which encourages buyers to drive for lower prices 
and salespeople to sell, not manage a relationship, thus maintaining an adversarial environment.   
Senior management often talk relationships while the managers charged with 
implementation operate in a transactional mode, which makes trust 
development and the achievement of mutual goals difficult if not impossible.  
Implementation of relationships requires changes in corporate culture and 
reward systems to reinforce the behaviors that generate trust, mutual goals 
and adaptation, and the other critical variables in the creation of a strong 
hybrid relationship. (Wilson, 1995, p. 344). 
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Theory development and advancing metrics that provide evidence supporting the tenets 
of the relationship model (such as the unique contribution of social bonding in influencing 
supplier allocation of tangible and intangible resources) are likely necessary precursors to the 
paradigm shifts in corporate culture and reward systems that Wilson (1995)  advocates.    
 
LIMITATIONS 
 
The empirical study that this report describes involves cross-section, survey, self-report 
data using fixed-point responses from one manager per firm and one side of a supplier-customer 
relationship.  While this profile of business-to-business research study may dominate the 
business-to-business research, each characteristic of the method possesses important limitations.  
Certainly the need for longitudinal research methods is relevant for the study of social bonding 
processes and their influence on suppliers’ resource allocations to customers, and vice versa.  
Longitudinal methods are challenging to apply and generate the issue of generalizability because 
of the small number of interfirm relationships that such studies typically examine; however, the 
increase in nuance, relationship coverage, and accuracy that longitudinal studies provide justify 
the substantial effort in doing such studies. 
Self-report surveys using fixed-point responses from one informant per firm invite 
discussion of several issues. Do other persons in the supplier firm have highly similar beliefs 
toward the same customer as the informant’s beliefs?  Certainly some variability in the responses 
would occur; and some of multi-person responses are likely to vary substantially for some share 
of suppliers if such research would include interviews with two or preferably more informants 
per firm.  Similarly, substantial variability in customer responses versus the supplier’s responses 
would occur for some share of customers--how does substantial variance in responses versus 
consistently the same responses between suppliers and customers influence the associations of 
the social bonding and resource allocations constructs?   
Also, the use of only seven-point self-reports for relative resource allocations limits the 
value of the study.  Do the respondents’ beliefs about the level of relative resource allocations 
match independent assessments of these allocations?  For example, do the reports about “the 
amount of time that your personnel spend working on the relationship” with this customer match 
with independent records of telephone calls, faxes, emails, and face-to-face visits with this 
customer and in-firm discussions about this customer?  Relevant literature does include the use 
of different data sources to confirm self-reports versus observed behaviors in research on 
marketing-consumer relationships (Aurier & N’Goala, 2009); such research would be useful to 
emulate in business-to-business research contexts.  In conjunction with this question is the value 
of seven-point scales requiring informants to transform knowledge about concepts, interactions, 
and beliefs about one customer into a number ranging from 1 to 7.  Even though informants are 
able to do so, the collection of emic “thick-descriptions” (Geertz, 1973) of events and processes 
leading to the fixed-point responses would improve the value of such studies.   
The findings relate to manufacturers and distributors of manufactured products in one 
developed country.  Replications of the research and findings on an industry-by-industry level 
and for several nations might confirm the validity of the findings that this article describes. 
Thus, while the findings in the present study appear to be informative, the limitations 
suggest the need for caution in considering the accuracy and generalizability of the findings.  
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The findings in this report are suggestive and may be appealing but confirmation of the findings 
using other methods in additional industries, and in other nations, is necessary. 
Because the data permit only cross-sectional and not longitudinal analyses, these findings 
do not fully test the honeymoon model or the two other hypothesized social bonding models by 
time.  Conceptualizing honeymoon versus post-honeymoon relationships implies that 
longitudinal analysis is more relevant than cross-sectional relationships.  Relationships are more 
likely to terminate earlier when either party believes that low versus high social bonding 
describes the relationship.  Examining the sustainability and termination of supplier-customer 
relationships at the interfirm level would be a challenging undertaking that this study leaves for 
future research. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The present study theoretically extends the possibility that social behavior in its 
elementary form of social bonding affects supplier allocations of scarce resources--dollars, time, 
physical items, and intangibles (KSIB).  Findings from a preliminary survey of suppliers in 
manufacturing and distribution firms in one economically developed country confirm this 
theoretical extension.  Additional research within industries and across several nations that 
incorporates examining the social bonding beliefs for both suppliers and customers within 
specific interfirm relationships is worthy of consideration. 
Wilson’s (1995, p. 342) observation still appears accurate for 2010 and beyond, “Our 
knowledge about relationships is at an early stage.”  While the interaction model (Hakansson, 
1982; Walter, Hölzle, & Ritter, 2002) by the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) Group 
serves well in advancing relationship marketing theory, and in demonstrating research methods 
that include in-depth interviews of multiple informants among supplier and customer firms, 
research focusing on advancing theory and testing micro (elementary) social behavior within-
the-same interfirm relationships still is at an early stage of development.   
What are the important antecedents that affect social bonding processes?  What are the 
specific mechanisms (processes) among these antecedent conditions that result in high versus 
medium and low social bonding outcomes?  Research focusing on providing accurate answers to 
such issues is worthy of consideration. 
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Appendix 
A.  Instructions for the Resource Allocation Scale Items 
“Please consider your firm’s relationship with your chosen customer at present.  How high is 
your organisation’s level of input of the following resources into the relationship, compared with 
your other customers?”  (1 - 7 scales from “Very much lower” to “Very much higher”) 
• Dollars your firm puts into the relationship 
• Physical items such as equipment your firm puts into the relationship 
• The amount of time that your personnel spend working on the relationship 
• Your intangible inputs, such as knowledge, skills, ingenuity, and your business contacts 
(KSIB) 
 
B.  Instructions for the Relationship Bonding Scale Items 
“How much do you agree with the following statements about your firm’s relationship with the 
chosen customer, as compared with other customers?”  (1 - 7 scales from “I do not agree at all” 
to “I fully agree”) 
• We have strong social bonds with people in the customer organisation 
• The relationship is very profitable for us 
• Our firm shares a lot of goals with this customer 
 
 
